Paradigms in Industrial Relations: Original, Modern and Versions In-between

Bruce E. Kaufman

Abstract

This article argues that the industrial relations (IR) field has had two distinct paradigms — an original paradigm centred on the employment relationship, and a modern paradigm centred on unions and labour–management relations. In practice, IR scholars in the decades after the Second World War frequently adopted the former as a broad principle but followed the latter in research and teaching. The narrower labour–management paradigm has created a significant survival challenge for the IR field, given the marked long-term decline in union density in most countries. I join with others in arguing that to survive and prosper in the years ahead, the field needs to return to an updated version of the original ‘employment relationship’ paradigm. To promote this end, I describe the major features of the original paradigm, including its core positive and normative principle. I also outline how this core principle provides the foundation for an integrative IR theory of the employment relationship, which the field greatly needs to move ahead.

1. Introduction

The central thesis of this article is composed of three propositions. The first is that the industrial relations (IR) field in the twentieth century, particularly in its Anglo-Saxon version, has had not one but two paradigms. The first or original industrial relations (OIR) paradigm was centred on the employment relationship and included both union and non-union sectors and personnel/human resource management and labour–management relations. In most respects, it is a distinctly North American phenomenon, having been born there in the immediate post-First World War years. This paradigm went into eclipse in the 1930s and disappeared by the 1960s. It
was largely replaced by a second, more narrowly constructed paradigm centred on the union sector and associated topics, such as collective bargaining, labour–management relations and national labour policy. I call this the modern industrial relations (MIR) paradigm and it originated more or less simultaneously in Britain, Canada, the USA and elsewhere in the immediate post-Second World War period. In practice, a number of post-Second World War writers have used an ‘in-between’ version of the two paradigms; that is, they assert as a general principle that IR covers the entire employment relationship but then predominantly focus attention on the unionized sector.

The second proposition is that the modern paradigm, by taking an overly narrow and union-centric perspective on the employment relationship, has been a significant factor behind the oft-noted threatened status of the IR field worldwide and its marked decline in a number of countries (Ackers and Wilkinson 2003; Kochan 1998; Strauss and Whitfield 1998). This is not a criticism of unions per se; it is a recognition that a field largely associated with this particular institution (or any other institution) will necessarily tend to rise and fall with it. Unfortunately for IR, over the last two to three decades, unions and the organized sector of most economies have significantly eroded, with no rebound in sight. The IR field in some countries (e.g. Britain) has handled this challenge better than in others, but in the 1980s and 1990s, IR in nearly all countries felt substantial downward pressure (da Costa 2005; Kaufman 2004a; Keller 2005; Lee and Lee 2005). The reverse side of this proposition is that the best prospect for revitalizing the IR field is to move back to a contemporary version of the original broad paradigm that includes unions but also gives equal emphasis to other solutions of labour problems. Movement in this direction started in the mid-1990s (e.g. Blyton and Turnbull 1994; Edwards 1995; Hills 1995; Kaufman 1993), and my purpose here is to further encourage this shift by giving it a firmer historical and conceptual foundation.

The third proposition is that integrating human resource management (HRM) into the IR field is a welcome and overdue development. The IR field’s original impulse towards HRM in the 1980s–1990s was threatened, defensive and critical; in recent years, the stance has shifted towards greater accommodation, acceptance and integration (Edwards 2003; Guest 1990; Strauss 2001). One could view this shift as a strategy of expediency born out of the IR field’s challenged survival prospects. A contribution of this article is to show that HRM was actually an integral, well-accepted partner in OIR, so welcoming HRM back into the fold is not intellectual opportunism but a return to a long-held principle.

The article is organized into three sections. Section 2 outlines the major features and principles of the MIR paradigm, and how the field transitioned to it after the 1930s. Because the modern paradigm is well known to nearly all participants, only a modest summary is provided. Section 3 then provides a similar account of the major features and principles of the OIR paradigm, albeit in more depth and detail as this paradigm is largely
unknown to or unacknowledged by most IR scholars. Included in this section is identification of OIR’s foundational principle and a brief outline of how this principle can be used to create a theoretical base for the field. Section 4 is the conclusion and summary where I discuss the partial movement back to the original broad ‘employment’ paradigm, and why this shift is a positive development that should be further emphasized. The description and details of the OIR paradigm necessarily draws largely on the American experience, given that OIR was mostly limited to the USA, but many of the implications and principles are generic and applicable to the study of IR in all countries.

2. Transition to and features of the modern paradigm

As a formally constituted and recognized academic entity in the social sciences, IR had its birth in the United States in the period 1919–1920 (Kaufman 2004a). Of course, the intellectual roots of the field go back considerably further in time and extend to other countries. The foremost example would be the work of the English husband–wife team of Sidney and Beatrice Webb and their landmark book *Industrial Democracy* (Webb and Webb 1897); also highly relevant is the work of the late nineteenth-century economists of the German historical–social school, such as Lugo Brentano and Max Weber.

The IR field that started out in North America in the early 1920s has only modest resemblance to the IR field today. Vestiges remain of the original paradigm, but for the most part, and as a central tendency, the modern paradigm is much more narrowly constructed.

The subject domain of the OIR paradigm was the *employment relationship*. This included all manners of employment relationships — private and public, union and non-union, and formal and informal. This fact was widely expressed in the early American literature of that period, per these two quotations:

> [T]he focal point of the field [industrial relations] is the employer–employee relationship (Social Science Research Council 1928: 19)

In the broadest sense, the term ‘industrial relations’ comprises every incident that grows out of the fact of employment (National Industrial Conference Board 1931: 1).

A similar, if somewhat more colloquial, definition is given by John Hilton, a British IR scholar of the 1930s, who stated, ‘Industrial relations . . . [is] how people who draw wages and the people who pay the wages get on together’ (quoted in Lyddon 2003: 95).

This broad conceptualization of IR could still be found into the 1960s. In the USA, for example, Heneman (1969: 4) states:
Industrial relations is concerned with employment relationships... Its central focus is employment, in all aspects (micro and macro, individual and group): labour marketing, labour relations, personnel management and the like.

This perspective was also sometimes featured in British writings (e.g. Richardson 1954), per the observation of Behrend (1963: 383) that, 'The term industrial relations is used in two different senses: it is sometimes used as an all-inclusive term and sometimes as a term restricted to collective relations.'

Over the next three to four decades, the IR field gradually shifted to a narrower paradigm that had unions, collective bargaining and labour–management relations at its core. The original impetus for this shift was, to a significant degree, a pragmatic accommodation to reality; that is, after the Second World War, unions and all things having to do with them (e.g. strikes, wage drift) quickly became hugely important and in many respects, the number 1 national labour issue. However, the field’s shift towards unions was not only a pragmatic accommodation but an intellectual and ideological commitment on the part of many scholars, not only to collective bargaining but to larger programmes of social democracy and collective organization of the economy. Hence, the ‘labour–management’ focus of MIR rather quickly hardened and the other parts of the employment relationship field were excised or treated as second-class partners. In many European and Asian non-English-speaking countries, IR only took root in the 1960s and afterwards, and the ‘collective relations’ focus was adopted from the start, albeit sometimes embedded in a wider political and social context (Frege 2007; Keller 2005).

The transition from OIR to MIR is evident in the way scholars in the 1970s and 1980s defined the scope of the field. They would first give a bow to the broad OIR paradigm and tell readers that IR encompasses the entire employment relationship, but then quickly move to the narrower MIR conception by noting that in practice, the field focuses primarily on unions and collective bargaining. Hyman (1975: 12), for example, defined IR as ‘the study of the processes of control over work relations, and among these processes, those involving collective worker organizations and action are of particular concern’. In a similar fashion, Kochan and Katz (1988: 1) state that IR ‘encompasses all aspects of the employment relationship’, but then qualify this by observing that the field gives ‘special attention to the relations between labour and management’.

By the 1980s, most people inside and outside IR realized that, expansive claims notwithstanding, the field had narrowed to cover only one part of the employment relationship — the unionized, collective relations part. Canadian Roy Adams (1993: 8) clearly states this fact:

[I]ndustrial relationists, while paying lip service to the goal of achieving understanding, prediction and control over all aspects of employment, in practice, tend to focus most of their attention on unions, collective bargaining, and miscellaneous labour market issues.
In a similar vein, Strauss and Whitfield (1998: 4) note, ‘Until recently, academic industrial relations in most countries focused primarily (though not exclusively) on union–management relations.’ Towers (2003: 13–14) observes that in Britain, IR had a ‘self-imposed limitation’ that made collective bargaining ‘a virtual synonym for industrial relations’, while German Berndt Keller (1996: 202) remarks: ‘Discussions of the future of industrial relations always tend to turn into a debate on the future of trade unions.’

In the USA, the passage from the OIR to the MIR paradigm occurred in a slow and largely unremarked upon manner (Kaufman 1993, 2004a). The beginning point was in the 1950s and the influential writings of the neo-institutional labour economists who formed the core of post-Second World War American IR, such as Dunlop, Kerr, Lester and Reynolds. They became involved in IR and founded the Industrial Relations Research Association for three related reasons: first, as a reaction against the competitive price theory style of labour economics associated with the University of Chicago and, in particular, Friedman and Stigler; second, as a forum for research in a more heterodox approach to labour economics (e.g. multi-disciplinary, participant–observer methods, imperfect competition, role of institutions); and third, as a place for people interested in and relatively receptive to the study and practice of collective bargaining and labour–management relations — then the dominating issues in labour but often not sympathetically viewed by economists.

So framed, the IR field in the decade after the Second World War had many similarities and linkages to the OIR born after the First World War. But over time, the post-Second World War labour economists (and fellow travellers in sociology and law) shifted the field in a discernibly different and narrower direction. As described shortly, management and the practice of HRM (then personnel management) played a large role in OIR but were slowly shunted to the theoretical and ideological sidelines, partly as a result of the events of the Great Depression and New Deal and partly because of (in particular) Dunlop and Kerr’s antipathy to human relations, organizational behaviour (OB) and HRM. All of these topics, and non-union employment relations in general, are noticeably missing, for example, in Dunlop’s field-defining book *Industrial Relations Systems* (Dunlop 1958). Several decades later, IR writers such as Kochan et al. (1986) endeavoured to reintroduce management into IR, leading to a modest boomlet in research on high performance work systems (HPWS) and other such topics, but even here the focus of attention tended to be somewhat critical and oriented towards developing a place in the HPWS schema for unions and collective bargaining (e.g. Godard and Delaney 2000; Kochan 2000). Likewise, the heterodox insurgency launched by Dunlop, Kerr and other like-minded labour economists peaked in the mid- to late-1950s and then noticeably waned.

Shorn of a good portion of its management wing and with a fading link to institutionalism and economic heterodoxy, American IR slowly evolved into its modern form. What was left to provide the central core of the field was the subject of trade unions, collective bargaining, labour–management relations
and associated issues of labour policy, while the very existence of an earlier OIR tradition disappeared from sight. Any American textbook on IR published in the last two decades reveals this orientation (e.g. Kochan and Katz 1988); also apropos is the statement of Locke et al. (1995: xiii): ‘Industrial relations emerged as a distinct field of study and a locus for public policy in the aftermath of the Great Depression and the Second World War. Its focus was upon the organization of workers through trade unions.’

The end result was largely similar in Britain, although it occurred more quickly and definitively (Ackers and Wilkinson 2003; Hyman 1995; Kaufman 2004a). Britain had a longer prehistory of academic work in the area of IR, extending back to at least Morrison (1857), but the actual institutionalization of the field in British universities occurred later than in the USA. The first step was in the mid-1930s when businessman Montague Burton endowed three academic chairs in IR at Cambridge, Cardiff and Leeds. The charter given to the chair holders was to ‘study and give instruction upon the conditions of employment and the relations between employers and employed, with special reference to the causes of industrial disputes and the methods of promoting industrial peace’ (quoted in Lyddon 2003: 95). This mandate appears to establish a wide domain that covers all types of employment relationships; as the field moved on, however, it quickly devolved to the study of only (or mostly) unionized employment relations.

It is widely agreed that the real institutionalization of the IR field in Britain did not commence until after the end of the Second World War. The seminal event was the formation of the ‘Oxford School’ at Nuffield College, centred around Hugh Clegg and Allan Flanders. Just as Dunlop’s book *Industrial Relations Systems* did much to define the post-Second World War IR field in the USA, so too in the UK did Flanders and Clegg’s book *The System of Industrial Relations in Great Britain* (Flanders and Clegg 1954). Clegg and Flanders were both closely associated with the British labour movement and expressed strong sympathies for its cause. In the book, they make clear that in their view IR focuses only on the formal institutions of collective rule-making and job regulation in the employment relationship, and excludes personnel management and human relations. On this matter, Flanders (1965) later said of IR, ‘The subject deals with certain regulated or institutionalized relationships in industry. Personnel, or in the language of sociology “unstructured”, relationships have their importance for management and workers, but they lie outside the scope of a system of industrial relations.’ This restricted conception of IR was reaffirmed by Tom Burns (1967: 195) who said, ‘Normally, it [the IR field] is reserved for all aspects of collective bargaining between employers and labour, whether the issues are national or local’ and by Richard Marsden (1982: 232) who observed, ‘Everyone, instinctively it seems, knows what industrial relations is about... It is “about” trade unions, managers and collective bargaining.’

As the British IR field moved into the 1970s, renewed controversy broke out about the conceptualization of IR, but in this case, the main drift had little to do with personnel/HRM and non-union employment relationships;
rather, the battle was between the orthodox pluralist conception of the employment relationship and a newly insurgent radical/Marxist view that modelled the employment relationship as a contested terrain of unalterably opposed class interests (e.g. Hyman 1975). With the advent of Thatcherism and ascendancy of neoliberalism, the IR field in Britain post-1980 went into marked decline, only arrested in the late 1990s with a new Labour government, some stabilization in union membership, and new institutional and policy developments to study emanating from the European Union (EU). The Marxist/radical component of British IR, although much diminished, remained visible and active (Gall 2003; Kelly 1998), complemented with a new feminist-oriented research programme (Wajcman 2000). The centre of debate within British IR, however, shifted rightward and in the 1990s focused on the relationship between HRM and IR. The dominant view at the time regarded HRM as a threat and unwelcomed interloper, although in recent years, British IR has not only substantially accommodated HRM but in certain respects taken it over (Ackers and Wilkinson 2003). The rediscovery of the management side of the employment relationship actually started in the 1960s in Britain; at first from a critical/radical position, but later from a relatively neutral or even managerial perspective (e.g. Gospel 1983; Wood 1982).

The MIR paradigm in its post-Second World War form has been described and discussed by numerous authors from a variety of countries (e.g. Ackers and Wilkinson 2003; Adams 1993; Budd 2004; Frege 2007; Godard and Delaney 2000; Keller 2005; Kochan 1998, 2000; Lansbury and Michelson 2003; Murray et al. 1996; and Strauss and Whitfield 1998). The following 10 items encompass what I perceive to be a relatively consensus view from these studies of MIR’s distinctive attributes and propositions. Of course, exceptions and qualifications to each statement can be found in individual studies.

(a) Conflict of interest in the employment relationship
Most writers identify conflict of interest in the employment relationship as the bedrock principle upon which the MIR field is based. Disagreement only occurs on second-order issues, such as whether this conflict of interest is partial or near complete, and whether it represents a positive or normative assumption.

(b) The employer has a power advantage over the worker
A second core MIR assumption is that the individual employer in a free-market (non-union) situation typically has a power advantage over the individual employee in both the external labour market and the internal governance system of the firm. The result is a tendency for wages and other terms of employment determined in the external market, as well as work effort, discipline and dispute resolution determined in the internal market, to be tipped in the advantage of employers, absent a countervailing institutional force.

© Blackwell Publishing Ltd/London School of Economics 2008.
(c) **Labour is not a commodity**

Although labour is a factor input and is traded in markets, in the MIR perspective labour is nonetheless unique because it is embodied in human beings and inseparable from them. The human essence of labour means that labour markets, in a number of respects, behave markedly differently than standard commodity markets (e.g. wages have greater rigidity and perform both an allocative and motivational function), thus necessitating an expanded, multi-disciplinary theoretical framework relative to standard microeconomic models. The human essence of labour also means that on normative grounds, the terms, conditions and treatment of labour carry a higher moral significance, and therefore merit greater social protection and regulation.

(d) **Industrial democracy is needed in workforce governance**

Another core MIR principle is commitment to some form of industrial democracy in the workplace. The employment relation should provide a mechanism for collective worker voice, employee representation in rule-making and rule-enforcement, and protected rights and due process in the resolution of disputes.

(e) **Pluralism in the employment relationship is the best/most practical model**

The preceding principles lead to another: the necessity and desirability of a pluralistic form of employment relationship. Pluralism in employment relations is a form of workforce governance composed of various partially autonomous, competing, and conflicting groups and associations both inside and outside the firm. These groups, representing the interests of stakeholders such as employers, employees, the local community and policymakers, set the rules of the IR system and govern the firm through a process of negotiation and compromise among more or less equals. The dominant position in MIR is that pluralism may not be the theoretically ideal system, but it is the realistically best alternative. This position was vigorously contested over the years, on the right by proponents of Human Relations/HRM, and on the left by Marxist/radical writers.

(f) **Focus on unions, collective bargaining and labour–management relations**

The MIR paradigm includes in its territory all types of employment relationships, but the model that occupies centre stage is collective bargaining and the practice of labour–management relations. Collective bargaining leads to an orderly, balanced and democratic determination of the terms and conditions of employment and governance of the workplace. As collective bargaining has declined in coverage and popularity, MIR has sought to accommodate this shift by bringing into the fold alternative forms of collective/independent voice, such as works councils, and supranational forms of collective employee regulation, such as EU labour directives.
(g) Unitarism and HRM/OB are separate from IR
A corollary of the premises cited above is that MIR was regarded as separate from and somewhat sceptical-to-antagonistic towards the fields of HRM and OB. These fields were regarded in many respects as in opposition to MIR as they (allegedly) are built on a unitarist (identity of interest) model of the employment relationship, promote a ‘top-down’ management-dominated form of workforce governance, and explicitly or implicitly minimize or deny the centrality of conflict and the necessity for collective representation and voice. From an MIR perspective, unitarism is unworkable in practice and becomes a smokescreen for employer control and union avoidance.

(h) Ideologically soft on unions and hard on non-union employers
Conflicting interests, pluralism, power imbalances, and the need for external regulation of markets and employment relationships are, in part, regarded within MIR as positive statements of ‘what is’. But MIR is also guided by normative values and ideological commitments concerning ‘what should be’ that predispose people to take a more favourable (or less critical) view of unions and employees’ interests, and a more critical or less favourable view of management and employers’ interests. Although less pronounced today, non-union employment relations were long viewed in MIR as socially suspect, as were the academic fields that studied or supported non-union employment relations.

(i) Theoretical roots in union studies and labour institutionalism
MIR lacks an integrative theoretical base and has a paucity of field-specific concepts and generalizations. Several taxonomies and frameworks have been advanced (e.g. IR systems, strategic choice, collective mobilization, regimes of workplace governance) that provide insight and guidance, but for the most part, MIR is a ‘borrower field’ that imports its theories and models from adjacent disciplines and fields, such as economics, sociology and law. To the degree MIR has theoretical roots, most modern participants in the field locate them in two related places. The first is the early path-breaking works on unions and the labour movement, such as the Webbs, Commons, and Perlman; the second is influential work by ‘labour institutionalists’ in the two decades after the Second World War, such as Clegg, Dunlop, Flanders, Fox, and Kerr.

(j) Origin in the 1930s and institutionalization in the early post-Second World War period
Writers on the history of IR almost uniformly locate the field’s emergence as a formal entity in the decade of the 1930s, commencing with the establishment of the three Burton chairs in Britain and the mass unionism and labour events surrounding the New Deal in the United States. In this historiography, the institutionalization of the field into MIR then fully develops and solidifies in the two decades after the Second World War, witnessed by the founding of several dozen academic IR centres and programmes,
academic IR journals and IR professional associations. The preceding tradition of OIR, by contrast, is notably omitted from the story.

3. The OIR paradigm

In this section, I describe more fully the main features and principles of the OIR paradigm (for more details, see Kaufman 2004a, 2007a). By the end of this section, it will be self-evident that the conception of IR that existed in the 1920s USA is sufficiently distinct and different from the post-Second World War conception that it qualifies as a separate (although overlapping) paradigm. It is, in particular, far broader and more inclusive with regard to subject domain, types of employment relationships and practices, and ideological commitments. Because this original paradigm is entirely missing in large parts from the contemporary IR literature (including the North American), I devote modestly greater space to its elaboration at key places.

Founding and Institutionalization

The term ‘industrial relations’ goes back to the mid-1880s (Adams 1886) but only gained public recognition in the early 1910s when President Wilson appointed John Commons and six other union, management and public representatives to serve on the Commission on Industrial Relations. It coalesced in meaning and formal identity by 1918–1919. In early 1918, the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey (SONJ) (a non-union company) established an IR department to conduct and supervise the management of labour. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first IR department in an American firm. In 1919, the Russell Sage Foundation Library (1919) published *Industrial Relations: A Selected Bibliography*, which, also to the best of my knowledge, is the first research publication to carry the IR term in the title and provide an explanation of the term’s meaning. According to the report, IR comprises two subject areas: *labour management* and *workforce governance*.

The academic/professional field of IR was born in 1920. That year, the University of Wisconsin, under the leadership of Commons, established a specialization in IR within the undergraduate economics major. Students studied four subject areas: labour management, labour law, causes of unemployment and workforce governance. In the same year, the Industrial Relations Association of America (IRAA) was founded. Earlier called the National Association of Employment Managers, the organization had approximately 2,000 members, most of whom were business consultants, writers and academics or personnel/employment managers in industry. The IRAA sponsored an annual conference and published a monthly magazine *Personnel*.

The IR field quickly expanded in both academe and industry. Dozens of companies established IR departments in the 1920s, including many of the largest and most progressive non-union corporations (e.g. DuPont, General
Electric, Goodyear, International Harvester). The first free-standing IR academic unit was created in 1922 when Princeton University created an Industrial Relations Section (still in existence today). The unit was the inspiration of Clarence Hicks, executive in charge of IR at SONJ, and was principally funded by John D. Rockefeller, Jr. (principal shareholder of SONJ). Hicks took the lead in establishing five other IR sections in the mid- to late-1930s at CalTech, Michigan, MIT, Queens and Stanford. (The CalTech, MIT and Queen’s units are still in existence, although in some cases renamed.) All were management oriented and were established, in part, as a reaction against the New Deal (Hicks 1941).

Motivation for Creating IR: The Labour Problem

The birth of IR as an academic/vocational subject area was primarily motivated by public and corporate concern over the deteriorating state of employer–employee relations in the early twentieth century. This deteriorated state, manifested by maladies such as large-scale violent strikes, high turnover and absenteeism, and the growth of militant trade unions and socialist political parties, was known at the time as the Labour Problem. The Labour Problem was widely viewed in most countries as the number 1 domestic social problem and, if unchecked, represented the greatest potential source of class polarization and socialist revolution. Public and corporate concern with the Labour Problem came to a head in 1918–1919 in all the industrial countries of the world because of a war-related wave of strikes and mounting fears of Bolshevism spawned by the Russian revolution.

Not coincidentally, IR was born in 1919–1920 as the Labour Problem peaked in intensity. The Labour Problem and IR were opposite sides of the same coin — the Labour Problem threatened to destroy democratic capitalism, and IR was devised by American reformers and progressives to solve the Labour Problem and save democratic capitalism. Commons and other proponents of IR created the field as a ‘middle way’ (or ‘third way’) between two other approaches to solving the Labour Problem. One was free markets and laissez-faire, as promoted by social conservatives associated with orthodox economics, the legal doctrine of freedom of contract and adherents of Social Darwinism; the second was various radical schemes meant to eliminate capitalism and the wage system, such as the workers’ co-operative movement, syndicalism and socialism.

OIR’s Four Solutions to the Labour Problem

OIR was built on four alternative solutions to the Labour Problem. In some respects, these solutions were substitutes and in other respects, complements. All rested on a fundamental proposition — that the ‘unorganized’ (free market/laissez-faire) American employment system of the early twentieth century, coupled with the great disparities in wealth and legal rights separating employers and employees and an excessive individualism that promoted social
irresponsibility, was the root cause of the Labour Problem. As described in more detail in a later section, OIR was, in this regard, essentially a revolt against economic orthodoxy, represented at the micro level by the model of a perfectly competitive labour market and at the macro level by Say’s Law.

OIR proposed to preserve capitalism and a market economy but make them work more efficiently and harmoniously, thereby taking the steam out of the Labour Problem. The idea was to ‘organize’ the labour market and employment relationship (i.e. bring greater order and rationality to them) through selective forms of institutional change. In this respect, OIR was closely allied with early writings in sociology, such as by Durkheim and Weber, and the early post-Second World War work of the German ordo-liberal economists, all of whom focused on ‘the problem of order’. In this regard, institutions — the socially constructed rules of the game — were central to OIR, for it appeared self-evident that the Labour Problem was a result of frictions, maladjustments and contradictions within the existing institutions of the employment relationship. Solution of the Labour Problem, therefore, required study of the legal order and other formal and informal institutions and selective reform thereof. OIR represented, in this respect, a species of social/institutional re-engineering and associated programme of reform. This orientation necessarily put OIR in direct conflict with orthodox economics on several counts: the latter suggested that the root cause of the Labour Problem lay not with internal defects of the capitalist market system but with external political/social forces, such as revolutionary socialism and trade union agitators; it excluded institutions and ethics from its theoretical corpus and took law as a given; and provided a powerful intellectual defence of laissez-faire (Fine 1956; Fried 1998).

I have described the four OIR solutions to the Labour Problem in much greater detail elsewhere (Kaufman 2003). In summary form, they are:

- Professional/Progressive Labour Management (HRM, Human Relations, etc.);
- Protective Labour Law and Social Insurance;
- Trade Unions and Collective Bargaining;
- Macroeconomic Stabilization.

In the American context, the first and fourth OIR solutions to labour problems were largely dropped from the field by the end of the 1950s, while the second gradually faded after the 1960s. In the British context, the early IR field never encompassed solutions one and four and number two was of marginal significance (reflecting the prevailing doctrine of ‘collective laissez-faire’), leaving trade unions and collective bargaining as the major problem-solving solution from the start.

The IR Strategy

By the end of the 1920s, a consensus view, or at least central tendency, had emerged regarding the best strategy for improved IR. The goal was to solve
the Labour Problem, leading thereby to a win-win of greater industrial
efficiency, social justice and labour peace. To do so, early industrial relation-
ists endeavoured to stabilize, professionalize, humanize, democratize and
balance markets, management and workforce governance by using the
four methods of institutional change noted above. The goal was sometimes
framed as ‘raising the plane of competition’ (Adams 1886); Commons (1934:
108) called the process a ‘managed equilibrium’.

Towards this end, early industrial relationists recognized that there is no
‘one size fits all’ approach to improved employment relations. The reason is
because of pronounced diversity in the circumstances determining the state
of firm-level employment relations, such as the state of the macroeconomy,
competitive conditions in the firm’s product and labour markets, the size of
the firm and nature of its technology and production process, the qualities
and characteristics of the employees, the skills and attitudes of the manage-
ment, and the web of government law and social norms. In particular, firms
were seen as arrayed along a continuum (or frequency distribution) from
‘worst’ employment relations to ‘best’.

The state of the macroeconomy determines the overall position of the
frequency distribution — it shifts leftward (towards worse employment rela-
tions) with recessions and depressions, and rightward (better employment
relations) with full employment. Commons regarded unemployment as the
greatest source of labour problems and capitalism’s weakest link; hence, a
central goal of IR is management of aggregate demand to maintain full
employment. The frequency distribution can also be shifted rightward by
government social insurance programmes. Employee benefits, such as health,
old age and unemployment insurance, tend to be undersupplied by firms in a
free-market system (because of externality and public good aspects), so gov-
ernment provision extends or strengthens these desirable employment prac-
tices across the workforce (assuming the programmes cover all or most firms).

Another part of the OIR strategy was to shift rightward the frequency
distribution of employment relations by simultaneously ‘pushing-up’ (or
cutting-off) the lower tail and ‘pulling-up’ (or moving forward) the upper tail.
The lower tail is comprised of low road employers with substandard wages
and employment conditions and autocratic methods of workforce gover-
nance. Employment relations here are often oppressive and conflictive, and
production is technologically backward and inefficiently organized. These
firms are encouraged to improve their employment relations, or get out of
business, by the stick of trade unionism and government labour law. The
upper tail is comprised of high road employers who provide above market
wages, job security, good working conditions and benefits, and fair treat-
ment. Employment relations here are typically harmonious and co-operative
and production is technologically advanced and efficiently run. These firms
typically have no need for unions and provide employment standards ahead
of government mandates; the principal IR tool to further expand and spread
the high road employment practices is innovative human resource manage-
ment practices, spurred by the pressure of full employment.
The Leading Role of Management

Perhaps surprisingly, of the four prongs of the IR strategy, the one that was given most attention in the United States and represented the leading edge of the field in the 1920s was the practice of professional/progressive labour management. In fact, it is no exaggeration to say that when OIR was born, it was largely perceived to be a strategic or political economy version of HRM (Kaufman 2004a, 2007a). In American industry of the 1920s, the practice of IR was most closely identified with the advanced corporate (non-union) practitioners of welfare capitalism, particularly those with a mechanism for collective voice. The employment system crafted by these leading firms was a forerunner of what is today called HPWS, and the most strategic component of this employment system was employee representation, today called employee involvement (Kaufman and Taras 2000; Kaufman 2001; Taras 2003).

The reason for the managerial emphasis in OIR is discussed in more detail in the next section; here, I simply wish to document the fact. One notes that there were two principal groups active in the creation of OIR: intellectuals and business people. Among the intellectuals, the leading role was played by Commons and associates of the Wisconsin School. Commons had originally thought that class conflict was inevitable and uneradicable, but changed his mind after the First World War and concluded that policy makers and employers could, through social engineering of the employment system at the macro (national) and micro (firm) level, largely reconcile the interests of capital and labour and solve the Labour Problem. This idea is heralded by the concluding chapter in his 1921 book *Industrial Government* titled, ‘The Opportunity of Management’. He says in it, ‘capitalism can cure itself, for it is not the blind force that socialists supposed; and not the helpless plaything of supply and demand, but it is Management’ (Commons 1921: 272). Also revealing is the second book that Commons wrote at the birth of IR, titled *Industrial Goodwill* (Commons 1919). The book describes strategic choice among five alternative employment systems, how employers can get competitive advantage through positive employment practices, and the opportunity of personnel management to close the gap between Labour and Capital (Kaufman 2007a). As Commons conceived OIR, progressive (often non-union) employers are the strategic, active force charting the upward path to better employment relations, with unions, protective labour law and macro-economic policy providing a supporting foundation. His student and colleague Selig Perlman (1928: 207) aptly described the defining characteristic of the new model of IR as ‘From a demand and supply capitalism to welfare capitalism’.

Business people were as much, if not more, responsible for the birth of IR than were the intellectuals. IR was invented by business people as their strategic solution to the Labour Problem. As I have argued elsewhere, the person most responsible for promoting and spreading IR in both academe and industry was John D. Rockefeller, Jr. (Kaufman 2004a). Rockefeller was
the son of the world’s richest capitalist, and his family fortune and reputation were gravely threatened by the Labour Problem; in particular the calamity of the Ludlow Massacre at the Colorado Fuel & Iron Company (CF&I) in 1914 and two large and violent strikes at SONJ in 1915–1916. Having more to lose from the Labour Problem than almost anyone else, and abetted by a ‘born again’ conversion to progressive management originating with his Canadian mentor and consultant William Lyon Mackenzie King, Rockefeller became a life-long proponent of IR and, in particular, collective employee voice. Thus, it is no accident that the leading corporate practitioners of welfare capitalism and employee representation joined together in the Rockefeller-financed Special Conference Committee (SCC) and advised through the Rockefeller-created consulting organization Industrial Relations Counselors, Inc., were widely viewed as at the epicentre of American IR in the 1920s. Numerous foreign delegations came to the United States in the 1920s to observe the much-touted new IR model, much as foreigners travelled to Japan in the 1980s to witness the miracles of Japanese management (Kaufman 2007a). The companies they visited were the advanced welfare capitalist firms, such as the members of the SCC (e.g. General Electric, International Harvester, SONJ), while little attention was given to American unions or labour law because both were viewed as not only backward but (particularly in the case of the craft unions of the American Federation of Labor) largely irrelevant, if not harmful, to the new regime of scientific mass production (‘Fordism’) (see Rodgers 1998).

Of course, all of this changed in the 1930s when, under the weight of the Great Depression, the tools of progressive labour management and full employment monetary stabilization (the latter championed by Commons during the 1920s) crumbled. The proponents of OIR shifted to collective bargaining and labour law/social insurance as the best way out of the debacle, while in many eyes (Commons and a few others excepted), management was a discredited and often retrograde influence. Collective bargaining, in particular, became the favoured instrument of the academic/political wing of IR, both as device for correcting deplorable and often autocratic employment conditions in industry and as a mechanism for promoting greater purchasing power (through higher wages) and economic recovery (Kaufman 1996). These considerations led to the Wagner Act, widely viewed in MIR as having established collective bargaining as the ‘preferred institutional mechanism’ for employment relations (Kochan et al. 1986: 24).

Pluralism and Unitarism in Employment Relationships

In 1916, Rockefeller published an article titled, ‘Labor and Capital — Partners’ (reprinted in Rockefeller 1923). In it, he frames the central issue giving rise to the new field of IR. With reference to the Labour Problem, he states (p. 43), ‘To say that there is no way out except through constant warfare between Labor and Capital is an unthinkable counsel of despair.’ He then (p. 47) describes the central intellectual and practical challenge of IR as being,
the discovery of some mutual relationship between Labor and Capital, which would afford to Labor the protection it needs against oppression and exploitation, while at the same time promoting its efficiency as an instrument of economic production. Later in the article, he describes the purpose of IR as ‘prevention of friction’ (p. 54). With the idea of friction in mind, it will be noted that in the orthodox economic theory of this era (and today?), the accomplishment of this task is completely and optimally performed by one and only one institution — the operation of demand and supply and the Invisible Hand in a perfectly competitive and frictionless labour market.

The state of constant warfare referenced by Rockefeller was seen by the proponents of IR as an endemic and inevitable part of Demand and Supply Capitalism (DSC). In DSC, the two sides approach the employment relationship as commodity buyers and sellers, much as traders in the market for oil or wheat. The object of employers and employees is to maximize personal gain, self-interest is paramount, the mentality on each side is the commercial maxim ‘buy low/sell high’, and the strategic relation is a continual state of adversarial bargaining. Distrust, opportunism, hidden information and conflict, factors banished by the power of assumption in the theoretical world of perfect competition, arise in full force in the real world of employment relations. The result is substantial inefficiency, injustice and warfare. Inefficiency and conflict arise because DSC pits the two parties against each other as short-term adversarial bargainers embedded in an environment of bounded rationality and hyper competition, causing them to gravitate towards what is today called the non-co-operative equilibrium in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game (Miller 1991). In such an equilibrium, the employers’ strategy is to get as much work as possible from employees and pay them as little as possible, while the employees’ strategy is the reciprocal — to extract as many resources as possible from the firm and work as little as possible. The end result is endemic conflict (warfare), low productivity, and low wages, leading to a zero-sum outcome at best and, often, a negative-sum outcome.

The name given in the early twentieth century to the dysfunctional negative-sum employment outcome of DSC was the Labour Problem, the name given to the discovery and implementation of the new positive-sum institutional architecture was Industrial Relations. Not by accident, the single most used word in the lexicon of early IR is co-operation (Kaufman 2007a). It is repeated over and over like a mantra. IR, therefore, is about using institutional change and social engineering to modify and strengthen the market system in order to promote a co-operative mutual-gain outcome. This idea was most directly inspired by the writings of Frederick Taylor on scientific management, and it was Taylor (1911) who most cogently linked the achievement of co-operation with the creation of an identity of interests between employers and employees — a form of employment relationship widely called unitarism. The idea is that co-operation is maximally achieved and yields the highest productivity when everyone is working towards a common goal or shared set of interests (i.e. pulling in the same direction rather than in competing directions).
The central question that motivated all participants in early IR was, therefore, the following: how do individual firms and the nation as a whole move from the industrial warfare and negative-sum outcome of DSC to the co-operative and mutual-gain outcome of IR? Alternatively stated, the question is: how can society encourage firms and employees to move from an employment relation of antagonistic rivalry to friendly co-operation?

Both academic and practitioner members of OIR endeavoured to answer this question. Essentially, both subscribed to a three-stage progression in employment relations, starting from the open warfare stage of DSC, progressing to an intermediate stage of pluralism, and ending at the final stage of unitarism. Hicks (1941), arguably the most influential IR executive of the 1920s, frames this progression as a movement from ‘Autocracy’ to ‘Two Antagonistic Parties’ to ‘Unity of Interest’. Commons, the chief academic theoretician of OIR, states the same idea in the introduction to *Institutional Economics* (Commons 1934: 6; emphasis in original). He tells readers that efficiency is a core principle of institutional economics because it ‘overcomes scarcity by cooperation’. He goes on to say, in a criticism of the artificial assumptions of classical/neoclassical economics, ‘But co-operation does not arise from a presupposed harmony of interests [worked out perfectly and without friction by the Invisible Hand], as the older economists believed. It arises from the necessity of creating a new harmony of interests — or at least order, if harmony is impossible, out of the conflict of interests among the hoped-for co-operators.’ Contained in this quotation is the three-step progression from the negative-sum disorder of primitive DSC to the zero-sum negotiated order of pluralism to the positive-sum co-operative order of unitarism, realized through an evolutionary process of institutional engineering and reform.

The academics and business practitioners of OIR were in large agreement, therefore, regarding the desirability of a unitarist employment system. The differences were second-order but nonetheless sharp and contentious. The principal areas of disagreement concerned how many firms could successfully practise unitarism and, correlatively, the role of trade unions and labour law and, particularly, how widespread and influential they would be. The academics, taking a more social and critical perspective, favoured a significant expansion of both; the business practitioners supported trade unions and labour law in principle but in practice sought for the most part to minimize both. Modestly greater convergence occurred on the subject of social insurance, particularly on the part of prominent ‘corporate liberals’ who supported reforms such as unemployment compensation and old age insurance (Burton and Mitchell 2003).

*The Three Faces of OIR*

Having outlined various features and perspectives of OIR, it is useful to present a summary description of the paradigm. The paradigm was comprised of three dimensions or ‘faces’ (Kaufman 2004a).
(a) Science-building
Science-building is largely an academic endeavour aimed at explaining behaviour and expanding knowledge through theory building and empirical investigation. The focus of science-building in OIR was on explaining the behaviours, institutions and outcomes associated with the employment relationship. The focus on the employment relationship included all forms of employment relationships (private/public, union/non-union) and emphasized a multi-disciplinary research approach in recognition that the employment relationship contains interconnected economic, organizational, psychological, social, legal, political and historical dimensions.

(b) Problem-solving
The second face of OIR is the application of science and knowledge to solving practical problems and devising public policy. As already indicated, in its problem-solving dimension, the focus of early IR was on solving the Labour Problem (or ‘labour problems’ in the plural form). The four instruments of problem-solving in OIR — professional/progressive labour management, labour law and social insurance, trade unions and collective bargaining, and macroeconomic stabilization/full employment policy — have already been identified and discussed. The central point of view was that free-market capitalism is inherently unstable, inefficient and unjust; hence, efficiency and equity are promoted by a wide-ranging but delimited programme of market regulation, power balancing and democratization of industry. This process of institutional reform must be evolutionary and adaptive in light of changes in the economy and the nature of social/economic problems; certainly, it is not a one-way street to ever-greater government (or union) control and regulation.

The duality between labour problems and IR is particularly revealed in the university textbooks used in the 1920s–1930s to teach IR (e.g. Watkins 1922). Titled ‘Labour Problems’ (or some variant), the front part was devoted to a survey of various labour problems (long hours, child labour, etc.), followed by sections on institutional solutions (e.g. personnel management, collective bargaining, protective labour law).

(c) Ethical/ideological
The third face of OIR expressed the ethical values and ideological position of the field regarding work and employment. Early industrial relationists were frank that the field was based on certain fundamental values. Slichter (1928) states on this matter, ‘From the ethical point of view, therefore, the labor problem is concerned with two principal things: with the effect of the prevailing institutions . . . upon the conflict between life and work, and with the institutional change needed to harmonize men’s activities as labourers with their interests as men.’ Explicit in this statement is the recognition that labour is embodied in human beings, and the conditions, performance and outcomes of work thus carry a higher moral significance than is true for inanimate factor inputs such as capital and land. Less clearly revealed, but an animating conviction, is the contention that the prevailing institutions of DSC were
systematically slanted in favour of property owners and consumers and against the interests and well-being of workers. Thus, values that are central to OIR are enshrined in propositions such as: the conditions and outcomes of work should meet minimum social standards; workers who provide the labour input should not be viewed solely as a means to greater production or a cost to be minimized, but also as human beings with legitimate interests in reasonable and rewarding conditions and outcomes of work; human rights should have precedence over property rights; and the workplace, like other spheres of society, should provide stakeholders with democratic rights, provisions for due process and opportunities for voice and representation (Budd 2004; Kaufman 2005).

The Core Principle and Theoretical Foundation of OIR

A major weak point of OIR is that none of its proponents ever developed and wrote down in one place a well-articulated theoretical framework, or even a statement of its guiding principles. Without some kind of theoretical base, science-building remains weak and dependent on other disciplines, problem-solving lacks for conceptual structure and guidance, and the normative propositions of the field have no apparent rationale other than a partisan ideological commitment. It is one thing to declare that the IR field covers the employment relationship, it is another to demonstrate that the field has something unique and value-added to contribute on the subject.

After many years of investigation, I have concluded that OIR does indeed have a theoretical core. In my interpretation, OIR at a broad level is a ‘political economy of labour’ formed from a union of three major (but not exclusive) elements: economics (orthodox and heterodox), sociology and law. In North America, IR was essentially the labour branch of institutional economics; in Britain and other countries, early IR also had a definite foundation in institutions, but with a stronger connection to sociology and politics than economics.

OIR was a critique of early twentieth-century orthodox economic labour theory and its corollary policy doctrine of laissez-faire; it was also an attempt to formulate an alternative labour theory and advance a reformist policy programme for expanded social protection and regulation of employment. The theoretical foundation of OIR began with one core principle. This principle is both positive and normative. Stated in the affirmative, this core principle asserts that labour is human; stated in the negative, it asserts that labour is not a commodity. The core principle of OIR is most prominently displayed in the Constitution of the International Labour Organisation (ILO), created by the Treaty of Paris signed in 1919 to officially end the First World War. It is no coincidence that the field of IR and the ILO were born at the same time for they sprang from the same intellectual roots and social concerns (Kaufman 2004a). Thus, it is instructive that the first of nine principles enumerated in the Constitution of the ILO reads: ‘Labour should not be regarded as a commodity or article of commerce.’
The orthodox economics of that period portrayed the employment relationship as a species of market exchange and, in particular, the exchange of a commodity-like entity called ‘labour’ in a perfectly competitive labour market. The theory shows that flexible prices, operating through demand and supply, yield the most efficient allocation of resources, production of goods and services, and set of wages and working conditions; it also shows that all factor inputs receive a payment commensurate with their contribution to production, suggesting a competitive market also yields fairness in distribution — a proposition Budd (2004) refers to as ‘marginal productivity justice’. In this theoretical world, the employment relationship is frictionless and problem-free and no other institution than the market is needed to co-ordinate and protect labour.

This conclusion has mortal implications for IR. The concept of labour problems has no theoretical grounding as competition and the market lead to Pareto optimal outcomes. Likewise, the four institutional tools of OIR are redundant and valueless: demand/supply handles all aspects of HRM, keeps the macroeconomy at full employment, solves all conflicts of interest without labour law (via private bargaining and the Coase (1937) theorem), and obviates the need for unions to prevent exploitation and injustice. The import of orthodox labour theory is that the firm and employment relationship are, as a realistic matter, comprised of human beings, but for the purpose of understanding and predicting the operation and outcomes of the employment relationship, the human aspect of these people can be neglected without substantive harm.

The position of OIR, as well as the neo-institutional founders of MIR, is that the orthodox model of a perfectly competitive labour market is theoretically suspect; its major predictions are often empirically contradicted (particularly in the short run and without ex post theoretical extensions); and it justifies public policies towards labour that are neither efficient nor fair. In this respect, if the competitive core and Invisible Hand (first welfare) theorem of neoclassical economics defines the heart of orthodox labour theory, then IR is heterodox labour theory.

Unfortunately, this heterodox ‘political economy’ theory was never well developed then and remains quite underdeveloped today. In recent work, I have endeavoured to make progress on this matter, using Commons’ theory of institutional economics as a foundation. Space precludes all but a summary description (see Kaufman 2004b, 2007b, 2007c).

Commons claimed institutional economics springs from Adam Smith but diverges regarding key parts of his theory and the predicted Invisible Hand outcome. Among the key concepts in institutional economics are: bounded rationality, human consciousness, the transaction and transaction cost, incomplete contracts, institutions (i.e. forms of collective action that establish the rules of the game and structure human interaction), two alternative modes of economic co-ordination (price in markets, command/administration in organizations), firms as governance structures, and the role of institutions in closing contract incompleteness. The key criterion separating
orthodox labour theory from OIR labour theory is positive transaction cost.

As is well recognized (e.g. Jacobsen and Skillman 2004: 222), the model of a perfectly competitive labour market rests on an implicit assumption of zero transaction cost (zero costs of market contracting). Zero transaction cost, in turn, rests on the other assumptions of the competitive model, such as a perfectly rational and omniscient economic agent, perfect information, and perfectly divisible and enforced property rights. Here enters the core OIR principle that labour is embodied in (real) human beings. Real human beings have bounded rationality and operate in an environment of pervasive uncertainty and imperfect information. As a result, it is impossible to write and enforce complete labour contracts, implying the existence of positive transaction cost. With positive transaction cost, in turn, I have elsewhere shown that the perfectly competitive labour model, and the corollary demand and supply diagram, break down and have no theoretical existence (Kaufman 2007d). In their place must be substituted a theory of imperfect competition in labour markets, extending even to the complete displacement of external labour markets and their replacement with hierarchial organizations (e.g. firms and internal labour markets) co-ordinated by management command and administration.

In such a world, the Invisible Hand loses some of its co-ordinating and allocative efficiency, to the point that it has to be supplemented/replaced with the Visible Hand of institutions and collective action (e.g. government, business firms, unions, social norms, ethical principles). Thus, a theoretical base for OIR emerges on the foundation of positive transaction cost, for positive transaction cost generates manifold labour problems, inefficiency in the use of labour in production and exchange, inequity and exploitation in the terms and conditions of employment, autocracy in firm governance, and a positive role for institutions to improve both the efficiency and equity of the employment relationship. Also opened up is wide opportunity for insights and contributions from other social science disciplines, as well as a direct link to concepts such as IR systems and varieties of capitalism.

4. Conclusion

The modern field of IR has been significantly challenged over the last two decades in nearly all countries of the world and has seriously declined in a number. One reason, no doubt, is that the severity of labour problems and capital–labour conflict in recent years is much reduced. Another important reason is that the field had the ill-luck and poor timing to largely abandon its original broad ‘employment’ paradigm and opt for a narrower ‘labour–management’ paradigm, just as union movements in most countries noticeably began to shrink, governments turned towards neo-liberalism and market deregulation, and the study of HRM/OB boomed in business schools.

What is to be done? The strategy promoted here is to return to the broad OIR paradigm — albeit in a contemporary form with stronger horizontal
linkages across all the social science fields and greater cultural, national and
gender inclusiveness — and make the employment relationship and all forms
of labour problems again the core subject and organizing concept for teaching
and research in the field. Happily, this is already well in progress. Beginning
in the mid-1990s, IR scholars in Britain, Canada, America and other
countries realized that the field needed to be rebroadened, and they set out to
accomplish this by making the employment relationship the foundation
concept (e.g. Bamber and Lansbury 2004; Budd 2004; Edwards 1995, 2003;
Hills 1995). This Journal (the BJIR), perhaps more than any other in
the field, has facilitated and promoted this trend (McMillan and Casey
2007).

The contribution of this article is to demonstrate that this move to a
broader ‘employment relations’ focus is not an entirely new idea or major
departure from tradition (also see Heery et al. 2008); rather, it is a return to
the OIR paradigm upon which the field was founded in the early 1920s. This
original paradigm gives contemporary IR much greater intellectual space and
more options for workplace betterment because it includes both pluralist and
unitarist employment relationships, union and non-union sectors, HRM and
collective bargaining, a much-broader array of solutions to labour problems,
and a normative value commitment that remains progressive and humanistic
but also more inclusive and neutral towards competing interests and ideolo-
gies. The challenge is to give this broad employment relations paradigm
intellectual substance so that it has something distinctive to offer relative to
other fields and disciplines. This requires, I believe, a strong base of theory,
the core of which I have endeavoured to sketch here and have expanded upon
elsewhere.

Final version accepted on 13 November 2007.

References

tradition — formation, breakdown and salvage’. In P. Ackers and A. Wilkinson
Adams, H. (1886). ‘Relation of the state to industrial action’. Publications of the
Adams, R. (1993). ‘All aspects of people at work: unity and division in the study of
labour and labour management’. In R. Adams and N. Meltz (eds.), Industrial
119–60.
Relations, 1: 383–94.
Blyton, P. and Turnbull, P. (1994). The Dynamics of Employee Relations. London:
Macmillan.

© Blackwell Publishing Ltd/London School of Economics 2008.


© Blackwell Publishing Ltd/London School of Economics 2008.


